State ex rel. Udall v. Employees Ret. In State ex rel. CYFD v. Kathleen D. Some courts have ordered additional compensation. See, e. Martin County, So. Conn v. Randolph, N. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, N. Lynch, P. State, S. Others have threatened to dismiss the charges. Lavallee v.
Justices in Hampden Superior Court, N. Wolff v. Ruddy, S. Yet others have stayed the prosecutions. Citizen, So. Proactive steps may be necessary when the present compensation scheme "raises serious concerns about whether [the defendants] will ultimately receive the effective assistance of trial counsel. Partain v. Oakley, S. Some of these courts applied their decisions only to their specific cases, while others set new state-wide standards.
Common among these decisions, however, is the courts' exercise of inherent authority to ensure that indigent defendants receive constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel. First, defendants ask that counsel be allowed to withdraw. Although it was appropriate for these attorneys to seek permission to withdraw because the "representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden," the trial court could not grant permission because withdrawal would have "material adverse effect on the interests of the client.
As noted, this case has been pending for several years, and the attorneys have interviewed dozens of witnesses and reviewed thousands of pages of documents. The prosecution itself has spent considerable resources on this case. It would be detrimental to the interests of the defendants and of the system of justice to permit the attorneys to withdraw, leaving it for new counsel to learn the details of this complex case from the beginning.
Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that, despite good faith efforts, the PD has not been able to find substitute counsel. This amount remains inadequate. Nevertheless, in our judgment, the amount requested by defendants will avert a constitutional challenge to the effectiveness of their counsel based on inadequacy of resources. As a result, we conclude that this additional money is essential to protect defendants' constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel so long as the State continues to pursue the death penalty.
Although defendants have asked that we dismiss the death penalty in this case, we believe the more prudent course is to stay the death penalty, affording the PD an opportunity to pursue supplemental funding.
Therefore, unless and until such amount is made available by the PD, pursuit of the death penalty against defendants Young and Lopez by the State is stayed. Wingo, U.
We believe that the Legislature intended to deter inmates from murdering correctional officers with a technical deficiency in training to the same extent as the murder of other corrections employees, fellow inmates, and visitors.
We conclude that this argument is without merit, see Ogden, N. In its notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the State alleged that Garcia was a peace officer acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty when he was murdered. Defendants argue that this aggravating circumstance is inapplicable in this case for three reasons: 1 corrections officers and jailers are not peace officers within the meaning of Section A-5 A ; 2 the employees of GCCF were neither corrections officers nor jailers; or 3 Garcia was not a corrections officer or jailer, and therefore not a peace officer, at the time of his alleged murder.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that there is probable cause to support this aggravating circumstance. Defendants contend that corrections officers, whose principal duty is to hold individuals in custody rather than to maintain public order, perform a different role than peace officers. Defendants argue that corrections officers only occasionally act in the role of peace officers, when making an arrest or enforcing laws on the premises of a New Mexico correctional facility.
Defendants also argue that Section A-5 protects corrections officers in other ways, by establishing an inmate's murder of employees of the Department of Corrections as one aggravating circumstance, Section A-5 E , and an inmate's murder of anyone lawfully on the premises of a penal institution as another aggravating circumstance, Section A-5 D. Defendants contend based on these provisions that the Legislature would have expressly included corrections officers in Section A-5 A if it had intended to provide them with additional protection as peace officers.
We review de novo the district court's determination that corrections officers and jailers are peace officers for purposes of Section A-5 A. See Ogden, N. Rowell, N. Relying on general rules of statutory construction, we focused on the purpose of the statute and noted that the strict construction of punitive statutes "should not be used to defeat the policy and purposes of a statute. The CSO position in that case involved tasks that had, prior to the creation of the position, been performed by city police officers, including traffic control, investigation of private property accidents, close patrol of residences, service of subpoenas, and investigation of certain misdemeanors.
CSOs were not trained in prisoner contact or control or dispatched to incidents in which suspect contact was anticipated. They did not carry guns, nor were they authorized to make arrests. However, CSOs wore uniforms similar to those worn by city police officers and drove marked patrol cars.
In addition, CSOs received their assignments from the city chief of police and were supervised by sergeants in the city police department. We rejected this interpretation. We highlighted the fact that "CSOs are charged with the duty to maintain public peace or order.
We also noted that "CSOs are threatened in their positions in the same way that police officers are, except that CSOs have less frequent contact with suspects who are known to be dangerous.
We use our analysis of CSOs in Ogden as a guide to our determination of whether corrections officers and jailers fall within the meaning of "peace officer" in Section A-5 A. We answer this question by turning to other statutes dealing with peace officers, including those specifically applying to jailers and corrections officers. This Court has held that jailers are included in this statute because "[a] jailer is an officer in the public domain, charged with the duty to maintain public order.
Rhea, 94 N. Consistent with Rhea, the Legislature has specifically provided that. Section A. The Legislature further provided that "[c]rimes against a jailer, including those persons employed by an independent contractor, shall be deemed the same crimes and shall bear the same penalties as crimes against a peace officer.
State v. Tabaha, N. However, in response to Tabaha, "[t]he legislature subsequently amended the correctional officers statute to provide that crimes against correctional officers and employees of the Corrections Department acting as peace officers were deemed crimes against peace officers.
Gutierrez, N. Based on the Legislature's response to Tabaha, it is clear that the Legislature intended to treat corrections officers, like jailers, as peace officers for the purpose of crimes committed against them when they are making arrests or enforcing the laws.
See id. In addition, we believe that Section and Section apply directly to our interpretation of Section A-5 A. In contrast to Section C , which expressly limits its application to uses of the term "peace officer" within the Criminal Code, the statutory provisions designating corrections officers and jailers as "peace officers" do not contain the same limitation.
Section A-5 A concerns a penalty for a crime against a peace officer, and therefore, Section and Section serve as powerful indicators of the Legislature's intent in Section A-5 A. These statutes evince an intent on the part of the Legislature to treat corrections officers, jailers, and any employee of a local jail whose principal duty is to hold inmates in custody as peace officers for purposes of Section A-5 A when these individuals are murdered during the discharge of duties conferring peace officer status.
Perry, N. However, Illinois' statutes with respect to jailers and corrections officers differ from those enacted by our Legislature. See Perry, N. Other states have specifically expanded that definition to include such law enforcement personnel as. As compared to our citation to Perry, we believe it is more significant that we recited in Ogden the Legislature's amendment of Section in response to Tabaha as "further evidence that the legislature intended [Section] A-5 A to be interpreted broadly.
Based on this reference to juvenile corrections officers, as well as the context surrounding Tabaha, including this Court's determination in Rhea that jailers fall within the general Criminal Code definition of peace officers, we believe this Court understood in Ogden, as we hold in this opinion, that the Legislature intended to include corrections officers and jailers as peace officers in Section A-5 A.
As the Legislature has expressly indicated, corrections officers and jailers also serve a peace-keeping role, and their position is even more potentially dangerous than that of CSOs, who "have less frequent contact with suspects who are known to be dangerous. Through Section and Section , the Legislature has demonstrated its intent to protect corrections officers and jailers and to deter crimes against them during the course of their duties of maintaining order in penal facilities.
Our application of Section and Section to the definition of "peace officer" in Section A-5 A is consistent with our understanding in Ogden that the Legislature intended a broad interpretation of this aggravating circumstance to advance the purpose of protecting those who maintain order.
While it is true that Section A-5 E protects employees of the Department of Corrections, it does not protect jailers, including employees of independent contractors such as GCCF, whom the Legislature expressly designated as peace officers under certain circumstances. In addition, this provision applies not only to corrections officers employed by the Department but to all Department employees. Similarly, Section A-5 D is not duplicative of Section A-5 A because Section A-5 D also applies to individuals other than corrections officers, including visitors and other inmates.
As shown by the scope of these provisions, Section A-5 E and Section A-5 D are designed to deter murders committed by inmates. Unlike Section A-5 A , these provisions would not provide the same level of protection against murders committed by someone other than an inmate against a corrections officer who is carrying out an official duty, for example, a murder of a corrections officer by an individual attempting to help an inmate escape.
By contrast to Section A-5 D and Section A-5 E , "[t]he killing-of-a-peace-officer aggravating circumstance is designed to make criminals think twice before firing at a dark uniform. By designating corrections officers and jailers as peace officers under certain circumstances, we believe the Legislature intended to provide them with the extra protection and added deterrent value of Section A-5 A.
The three aggravating circumstances identified by Defendants serve different purposes and apply in different situations; these provisions do not become duplicative merely because there is probable cause to meet two of them under the facts of this case. As we noted in Ogden, this rule applies only if traditional rules of statutory construction prove futile in ascertaining a statute's meaning.
As our analysis above illustrates, the meaning of "peace officer" in Section A-5 A can be discerned by traditional rules of statutory construction, such as reading the provision together with statutes in pari materia, and after applying these rules, we are not left with the insurmountable ambiguity that would trigger application of the rule of lenity.
We conclude that "peace officer" in Section A-5 A includes jailers and corrections officers while they are engaged in the duties for which the Legislature designated them to be peace officers in Section and Section Robert Young Whittaker - Profile Details. They assist physicians during treatments and examinations and administer medications. The individual provides nursing services to patients or clients in areas such as health promotion, disease prevention, acute and chronic care and restoration and maintenance of health across the life span.
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